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The neo-Wicksellian approach to optimal monetary policy uses estimates of the neutral real interest rate, often in a Taylor-Rule. In a system with IS and output-gap inflation equations, Laubach and Williams (2003) use a Kalman filter approach to jointly estimate the neutral real federal funds rate and trend output growth. They find a positive link between these two variables, which Trehan and Wu (2007) show reduces the potential for policy to be misled by errors in tracking trend output. Laubach and Williams (2003) note that there is much error and uncertainty surrounding estimates of the neutral real rate, as Clark and Kozicki (2005) also find.
Although their estimation assumptions allow their approach to track the impact of drawn-out structural changes on the neutral real rate, they may not control for institutional factors that may have large, but temporary effects. But addressing such factors entails complicating a LaubachWilliams specification, which runs the risk that coefficient estimates may not converge to sensible values. Hence, a tension between greater precision and the need for parsimony arises.
We modify the Laubach-Williams model in a computationally tractable way by altering their IS relationship to reflect the extra, disintermediation channel through which nominal interest rates at times made regulatory ceilings on deposits binding and find that the effective federal funds rate was higher in these episodes. We use Duca's (1996) estimates of how binding Regulation Q deposit ceilings were, which is statistically and economically significant in traditional models of residential construction (Duca, 1996) and GDP (Duca, 1998) , as well as in a more modern DSGE framework (Mertens, 2006) . When these ceilings were binding, monetary policy induced disintermediation which curtailed lending in an era before the mortgage-backed securities market became deep. Thus when Reg Q was binding, monetary policy had a more restrictive overall effect, which if unaccounted for, leads to omitted variable bias and parameter instability in samples spanning the deposit regulation era and the post-1982 deregulated era.
We also modify the inflation equation to include Gordon's (1977) variables for the imposition and lifting of the Nixon wage-price controls. Given the small number of business cycles in the post-Korean War era, omitting an important factor affecting prices could affect inflation coefficients. Indeed, including these variables results in a much larger estimated effect of the output gap on inflation. Furthermore, the inclusion of both price and deposit regulation variables has notable effects on key economic coefficients, which have important implications for how policy should respond to deviations of inflation and output from desired levels.
II. Estimating the Natural Rate and Key Parameters
As in Laubach and Williams (2003) 
where NIXON and NIXOFF are Gordon's (1977) certificates (SSCs) are used because these semi-deregulated, small-sized deposits offered higher interest rates than did small time deposits [Mahoney, et al. (1987) and Duca (1996 Duca ( ,1998 ]. RegQ equals 0 after 1982:Q2, when all deposit interest rate ceilings were lifted (see Figure 1 ).
2 1 Wages and prices were initially frozen for 90 days in 1971, followed by three other phases that limited wage and price increases (Council of Economic Advisors, 1972 , 1973 with the view that omitting a Regulation Q variable will lead to over-estimates of the impact of real rate interest rates in the post-Regulation Q era and less precisely estimated coefficients.
The wage-price control variables are also statistically significant, with the imposition and lifting of the controls having the expected negative and positive effects, respectively. Moreover, their inclusion raises the sensitivity of inflation to the output gap by 53% (0.0670 in the baseline LW model vs. 0.1024 in the regulation model). A plausible interpretation is that excluding these variables leads to an omitted variable bias that will give a misleading under-prediction of how the output gap affects price pressures because the wage-price controls effectively prevented inflationary pressures from lagged inflation and the output gap from normally affecting inflation in the early 1970s. Reflecting the significance of both regulatory variables, differences in loglikelihood statistics imply that the regulatory model has a statistically significant better fit than the baseline model. For completeness, other models with only one regulatory variable are also
shown.
In each of the baseline and regulation models (models 1 and 4, respectively), the onesided estimates of the neutral real interest rate are more variable than two-sided estimates (see Figure 2 ), underscoring the real-time difficulties that Laubach and Williams note in estimating the neutral real rate. Nevertheless, estimates of the neutral real interest rate from the regulation model are higher than those from the baseline model before Regulation Q ended.
III. Implications for Monetary Policy
The monetary policy implications of the baseline and regulatory models can be assessed by reviewing how the effective federal funds rate could differ between the models and how the coefficient and neutral real interest rate estimates can lead to differences in policy prescriptions under a Taylor 
This effective funds rate is well above the actual federal funds rate when Regulation Q was binding (Figure 1) , implying that the overall effect of monetary policy was greater owing to disintermediation effects, but that these differences essentially vanish in the post-Reg Q era. 
where the coefficients on the inflation and output gaps are both 0.5 as in Taylor (1993) .
The impact of shocks can substantially differ across the models. For example, the impact of a one-standard deviation shock to monetary policy (about a 75 basis points rise in the real federal funds rate) on the output gap (upper-right panel, Figure 3 ) is smaller in the regulatory model, which has a smaller-sized real rate sensitivity of aggregate demand than the baseline model. In fact, the peak difference occurs 5 months following a shock, with the impact being 20 percent smaller in the regulatory model (-0.0419 versus -0.0524). To a similar extent, the output gap responds less to an inflation shock (which lowers the real rate) in the regulation model. This is illustrated by the response to a one standard deviation (about 75 basis points) shock to inflation (top middle-panel, Figure 3 ). Furthermore, inflation responds much more sharply to a one- The real rate prescribed by the Taylor Rule rises similarly at first in both models, but after a few quarters, less of the initial real rate hike is undone in the regulatory model (lower left panel, Figure 3 ). The responses differ most 15 months after the initial shock, with the real rate 33%
higher in the regulation model (0.0677 in the baseline and 0.0900 in the regulation model).
Nevertheless, these differences should be interpreted with caution as they are not statistically significant owing to the wide error bands.
We also tried several alternative specifications for robustness. In particular, Clark and Kozicki (2005) suggest that model uncertainty can lead to notably different estimates of the neutral real rate, for instance, when using the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)'s estimates of potential real GDP instead of jointly estimating potential output in the model. Accordingly, we estimated an alternative model which directly used the CBO's measure of potential real GDP instead of estimating it with a Kalman filter, and adjusted the Kalman filter estimation of the model to reflect fewer latent and more observable variables (details are available upon request from the authors). It is reassuring that the results are qualitatively similar in models 5-8.
IV. Conclusion
This paper extends the model of Laubach and Williams to include statistically significant regulatory variables and illustrates their economic importance in gauging the stance and conduct of monetary policy. Although we find estimates of the real neutral interest rate are similar in regulation and baseline models, there are large differences in the implied effective real federal funds rate in the Regulation Q era and large differences in key coefficient estimates. Our results are consistent with the findings of Dynan, Elmendorff, and Sichel (2006) that financial deregulation and innovation have notably altered the time series behavior of GDP. In a somewhat broader sense, not controlling for important regulations can result in omitted variable bias that misleads analysts into not only over-predicting the impact of real interest rates on output and the output gap, but also under-predicting the impact of the output gap on inflation.
Furthermore, when coupled with a Taylor Rule, our results imply that monetary policy may have a greater need to react to a given sized output gap shock if inflation is to be kept under control. In addition, because monetary policy has a somewhat smaller effect on aggregate demand when controlling for statistically significant regulations, our findings imply that the target federal funds rate prescription under a Taylor Rule would react somewhat more than would be indicated by a model omitting regulatory variables.
9 ) denotes significant at the 10% (5%) level. 5 is expressed at an annual rate. 
